After an election, when party positions and strengths are known, there may be a centrally located large party at the core position. Whether this is so can be determined by examining the McKelveyScho…eld symmetry conditions at the point. If the conditions are satis…ed, then this party will typically be able to form a minority government and control policy. In the absence of a core party, theory suggests that the outcome can be assumed to generated by a lottery associate with coalition risk.
1 Structurally Stable Local Nash Equilibria as a Model for Party Switching.
A standard model of political competition is one where party leaders adopt positions to maximize vote share in the context of an electorate whose preferences exhibit a stochastic element. For example, Hinich (1977) argued that vote maximizing candidates would adopt a position at the mean of the voter distribution. His argument for two-party competition has been extended by Hinich (1984,1989) , Coughlin (1992) and most recently by McKelvey and Patty (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2005) . Lin, Enelow and Dorussen(1999) have also obtained a "mean voter theorem", for the general case of many candidates. Applying a stochastic model of voting is the standard technique for estimating voter response in empirical analyses ( Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 2000) . In an early application it was noted by Poole and Rosenthal(1984) that there was no evidence of convergence to the electoral mean in US presidential elections. Recently, empirical analyses of party competition in the US, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Israel have constructed "stochastic" spatial electoral models and found divergence of party positions away from the electoral mean . 1 These empirical models have all entailed the addition of heterogeneous intercept terms for each party. One interpretation of these intercept or constant terms is that they are valences or party biases. "Valence " refers to voters' judgements about positively or negatively evaluated aspects of candidates, or party leaders, which cannot be ascribed to the policy choice of the party or candidate (Stokes, 1992) . One may conceive of the valence that a voter ascribes to a candidate as a judgement of the candidate's quality or competence. This idea of valence has been utilized in a number of recent formal models of voting (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Groseclose, 2001; Aragones and Palfrey, 2002) . .
The next section of this paper presents such a characterization, in terms of the Hessian of the vote share function of the party leader or candidate who has the lowest valence. For the case when the stochastic errors have the Type I extreme value (or log Weibull) distribution, : Theorem 1 shows that there exists a "convergence coe¢ cient "which is a function of all the parameters of the model. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a "local Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium" at the electoral mean is that this coe¢ cient is bounded above by 1. When the policy space is of dimension w; then the necessary condition for existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium at the electoral mean, and thus for the validity of the "mean voter theorem", is that the coe¢ cient is bounded above by w:In the two dimensional case, the eigenvalues of the Hessian can be computed. It is shown that the convergence coe¢ cient is (i) an increasing function of the maximum valence di¤erence (ii) an increasing function of the number of parties or candidates and (iii) an increasing function of the electoral variance of the voter preferred points . Similar analyses can be carried out under the more generaal assumption that the stochastic distribution is multivariate normal, and in this case the coe¢ cient is a decreasing function of the stochastic variance.
When the necessary "convergence condition" fails, then the origin will be a saddlepoint or minimum of the vote share function for the lowest valence party. By changing position in the major electoral axis (or eigenspace of the vote function) this party will increase vote share. It follows that in equilibrium, all parties will adopt positions on this principal axis, with the lowest valence parties the furthest from the origin. No party will adopt a position at the electoral mean. The empirical section of this paper shows that the convergence condition fails for an electoral model for the election of 1996 in Israel, but is astis…ed for the model the Netherlands in 1979. . Simulation of the empirical model for Israel found that the vote maximizing positions of the parties were indeed not at the electoral mean . Although there was a close correspondence between the estimated actual positions of the parties and the equilibrium positions obtained by simulation, these positions were not identical.
These stochastic models all assume that the party leaders are motivated simply to maximize vote shares in order to gain o¢ ce. Moreover, because the model focuses on expected vote share, it ignores the possibility of uncertainty in electoral reponse.One way to introduce uncertainty, at least in two-party models is to focus instead on the "probability of victory". Implicitly, such a model acknowledges the the vote share functions are stochastic variables. To extend such a model to the multiparty case, where there are three or more parties, requires a modi…cation of the notion of "probability of winning". An obvious extension is to model electoral uncertainty in terms of the probabilities associated with di¤erent collections of decisive coalitions.The natural way to model party choice is then to allow party policy decisions to be made by party principals who have policy preferences. Section 3 models such policy-motivated choice using the idea of coalition risk and argues that the deviation of party position from vote maximizing equilibria in the Netherlands and Israel can be accounted for by the notion of coalition risk.
The primary purpose of the article is to present an equilibrium concept of party positioning in a formal model of elections that is potentially capable of explaining the rich diversity that can occur in multiparty polities. Because the proposed models are very precise about the consequences of changes in exogenous valence it is possible to draw out a number of conclusions about the political e¤ect of party switching, or pre election coalition agreements.
The general conclusions that can be drawn from the formal models are: (i) Under proportional rule, and with exogeneous valence alone,there will be a centripetal tendency that will make itself felt only for high valence parties. However, such parties will not converge to the electoral origin. As in Israel, if there are two opposed high valence parties, then they will locate on opposite sides of the mean, but on the principal electoral axis. For low valence parties, there will be a strong centrifugal tendency. Under vote maximization,such parties will locate along the "principal electoral axis". If they take up positions o¤ this axis, then it will typically be because of the e¤ect of coalition risk. This concept refers to the possibility that the position adopted by a low valence party will allow it to choose one or other of the high valence parties so as to constitute a governing coalition.This deviation is most noticeable in Israel, where Shas appears to locate itself in a position favorable to its ability to be pivotal in the formation of Likud based coalitions.
(ii) The paper uses the equilibrium notion of "local Nash equilibrium" (LNE). This concept allows for the balancing of the two di¤erent maximandsvote share and the ability to in ‡uence gvernment coalition. Although the local Nash equilibrium concept assumes that parties are well de…ned entities, the speci…cation of the utility function of political agents allows for the determination of the equilibrium payo¤s to such agents, given the pre-existing party membership.
(iv) The LNE is said to be structurally stable (ss) if it insensitive to permissible changes of party membership ( that is by individuals or subgroups switching party membership). Using this notion,It is then theoretically possible, to evaluate the LNE payo¤s at various party associations to determine if the LNE is ss:A LNE that is not ss can then be destroyed by a switch of party allegiance. Some suggestions about the determinants of structural stability and instability are presented in a short conclusion. .. , .
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2 Local Nash equilibrium with electoral certainty and o¢ ce-motivated parties.
The purpose of this section is to construct a model of positioning of parties in electoral competition so as to account for the generally observed phenomenon of non-convergence .The model adopted is an extension of the multiparty stochastic model of Lin,Enelow and Dorussen(1999) ,constructed by inducing asymmetries in terms of valence. The basis for this extension is the extensive empirical evidence that valence is a signi…cant component of the judgements made by voters of party leaders. There are a number of possible choices for the appropriate game form for multiparty competition . The simplest one, which is used here, is that the utility function for agent j is proportional to the vote share ,V j , of the agent. With this assumption, we can examine the conditions on the parameters of the stochastic model which are necessary for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) for this particular game form. Because the vote share functions are di¤erentiable, we use calculus techniques to estimate optimal positions. As usual with this form of analysis, wwe can obtain su¢ cient conditions for the existence of local optima, which we term local pure strategy Nash equilibria (LNE). Clearly, any PNE will be a LNE, but not conversely. Additional conditions of concavity or quasi-concavity are su¢ cient to guarantee existence of PNE. However, in the models we consider, it is evident that these su¢ cient conditions will fail, leading to the inference that PNE are typically non-existent. Existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria is an open question in such games. It is of course true that the true utility functions of party leaders are unknown. However, comparison of LNE, obtained by simulation of empirical models, with the estimated positions of parties in the various polities that have been studied, can provide insight into the true nature of the game form of political competition. The key idea underlying the formal model is that party leaders attempt to estimate the electoral e¤ects of party declarations, or manifestos, and choose their own positions as best responses to other party declarations, in order to maximize their own vote share. The stochastic model essentially assumes that party leaders cannot predict vote response precisely. In the model with "exogenous" valence, the stochastic element is associated with the weight given by each voter, i, to the average perceived quality or valence of the party leader.
De…nition 1.The Stochastic Vote Model. The data of the spatial model is a distribution, fx i 2 Xg i2N , of voter ideal points for the members of the electorate, N , of size n. As usual we assume that X is a compact convex subset of Euclidean space, R w , with w …nite.Each of the parties,or agents, in the set P = f1; : : : ; j; : : : ; pg chooses a policy, z j 2 X, to declare. Let z = (z 1 ; : : : ; z p ) 2 X p be a typical vector of agent policy positions. Given z, each voter, i, is described by a vector u i (x i ; z) = (u i1 (x i ; z 1 ); : : : ; u ip (x i ; z p )), where
Here u ij (x i ; z j ) is the observable component of utility. The term , j is the "exogenous" valence of agent j, is a positive constant and jj jj is the usual Euclidean norm on X. The terms f j g are the stochastic errors, whose cumulative distribution will be denoted by : In empirical analyses and in this paper it is assumed that is the "extreme value Type I distribution" (sometimes called log Weibull). It is natural to suppose that the valence of party j; as perceived by voter i is the stochastic variate ij = j + j , where j is the expectation Exp( ij ) of ij :We assume that the valence vector
Because of the stochastic assumption, voter behavior is modeled by a probability vector. The probability that a voter i chooses party j is
Here Pr stands for the probability operator generated by the distribution assumption on . The expected vote share of agent j is
We shall use the notation V : X p ! R p and call V the party pro…le function. In the vote model it is assumed that each agent j chooses z j to maximize V j , conditional on z j = (z 1 ; ::z j 1 ; z j+1 ::; z p ).
Because of the di¤erentiability of the cumulative distribution function, the individual probability functions f ij g are C 2 -di¤erentiable in the strategies fz j g. Thus, the vote share functions will also be C 2 -di¤erentiable. Let x = (1=n) i x i . Then the mean voter theorem for the stochastic model, asserts that the "joint mean vector"z 0 = (x ; : : : ; x ) is a "pure strategy Nash equilibrium". Lin, Enelow and Dorussen (1999) used C 2 -di¤erentiability of the expected vote share functions, in the situation with zero valence, to show that the validity of the theorem depended on the concavity of the vote share functions. They asserted that a su¢ cient condition for this was that 2 was "su¢ ciently large". Because concavity cannot in general be assured, we shall utilize a weaker equilibrium concept, that of "Local Strict Nash Equilibrium"(LSNE). A strategy vector z is a LSNE if , for each j; z j is a critical point of the vote function V j (z 1 ; ::z j 1 ; z j :; z j+1 ; ::z p ) and the eigenvalues of the Hessian of this function (with respect to z j );are negative. De…nition 2.1 gives the various de…nitions of the equilibrium concepts used throughout this book.
De…nition 2.Equilibrium Concepts.
(i) A strategy vector z =(z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j ; z j+1 ::z p ) 2 X p is a local strict N ash equilibrium(LSNE) for the pro…le function V : X p ! R p i¤, for each agent j 2 P;there exists a neighborhood X j of z j in X such that V j (z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j ; z j+1 ::z p ) > V j (z 1 ; :::; z j ::z p ) for all z j 2 X j fz j g (ii) A strategy vector z =(z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j ; z j+1 ::z p ) is a local weak N ash equilibrium (LNE) i¤, for each agent j;there exists a neighborhood X j of z j in X such that V j (z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j ; z j+1 ::z p ) V j (z 1 ; :::; z j ::z p ) for all z j 2 X j (iii) A strategy vector z =(z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j ; z j+1 ::z p ) is a strict; respectively, weak , pure strategy N ash equilibrium (PSNE, respectively, PNE) i¤ X j can be replaced by X in (i),(ii) respectively .
(iv) The strategy z j is termed a "local strict best response", a "local weak best response", a "global weak best response", a "global strict best response",respectively to z j =(z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j+1 ::z p ):
Obviously if z is an LSNE or a PNE it must be an LNE, while if it is a PSNE then it must be an LSNE. We use the notion of LSNE to avoid problems with the degenerate situation when there is a zero eigenvalue to the Hessian. The weaker requirement of LNE allows us to obtain a necessary condition for z 0 = (x ; : : : ; x ) to be a LNE and thus a PNE, without having to invoke concavity. The theorem below also gives a su¢ cient condition for the joint mean vector z 0 to be an LSNE. A corollary of the theorem shows,in situations where the valences di¤er, that the necessary condition is likely to fail. In dimension w, the theorem can be used to show that, for z 0 to be an LSNE, the necessary condition is that a "convergence coe¢ cient ", de…ned in terms of the parameters of the model, must be strictly bounded above by w: Similarly, for z 0 to be a LNE, then the convergence coe¢ cient must be weakly bounded above by w: When this condition fails, then the joint mean vector z 0 cannot be a LNE and therefore cannot be a PNE. Of course, even if the su¢ cient condition is satis…ed, and z 0 = (x ; : : : ; x ) is an LSNE, it need not be a PNE.
To state the theorem ,we …rst transform coordinates so that in the new coordinates, x = 0. We shall refer to z 0 = (0,...0) as the joint origin in this new coordinate system. Whether the joint origin is an equilibrium depends on the distribution of voter ideal points. These are encoded in the voter covariation matrix. We …rst de…ne this, and then use it to characterize the vote share Hessians.
De…nition 3: The electoral covariance matrix, 1 n r. To characterize the variation in voter preferences, we represent in a simple form the covariation matrix (or data matrix), r, given by the distribution of voter ideal points. Let X have dimension w and be endowed with a system of coordinate axes (1; : : : ; r; s; : : : ; w). For each coordinate axis let r = (x 1r ; x 2r ; : : : ; x nr ) be the vector of the r th coordinates of the set of n voter ideal points. We use ( r ; s ) to denote scalar product.
The symmetric w w voter covariation matrix r is then de…ned to be
where ( r ; s ) is the scalar product of r and s :The covariance matrix is de…ned to be 1 n r: We write v 2 s = 1 n ( s ; s ) for the electoral variance on the s th axis and
for the total electoral variance. The electoral covariance between the r th and s th axes is (v r ; v s ) = 1 n ( r ; s ): De…nition 4: The Extreme Value Distribution, : (i)The cumulative distribution has the closed form
with probability density function
and variance (ii) With this distribution it follows from De…nition 4 , for each voter i; and party ,j;that
Note that (ii) implies that the model satis…es the independence of irrelevant alternative property (IIA): for each individual i, and each pair,j; k; the ratio
is independent of a third party l( See Train, 2003,p.79) While this distribution assumption facilites estimation , the IIA property may be violated. Below we consider the case of covariant errors, thus allowing for violation of IIA.
The formal model just presented, and based on is denoted M ( ; ; ; r); though we shall usually suppress the reference to r:
De…nition 5. The Convergence Coe¢ cient of the model M ( ; ; ).
(i) At the vector z 0 =(0,..0) the probability ik ( z 0 ) that i votes for party,jis
(ii) The coe¢ cient A j for party j is
where I is the w by w identity matrix.
(iv) The convergence coe¢ cient of the model M ( ; ; ) is
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The de…nition of j follows directly from the de…nition of the extreme value distribution. Obviously if all valences are identical then 1 = 1 p ;as expected. The e¤ect of increasing j ; for j 6 = 1, is clearly to decrease 1 ; and therefore to increase A 1 ;and thus c( ; ; ): Theorem 1. The condition for the joint origin to be a LSNE in the model M ( ; ; ) is that the Hessian
of the party 1, with lowest valence,has negative eigenvalues. Comment on the Theorem. The proof of the Theorem is given in Scho…eld (2006) . The proof depends on considering the …rst and second order conditions at z 0 for each vote share function. The …rst order condition is obtained by setting dV j =dz j = 0 (where we use this notation for full di¤erentiation, keeping z 1 ; : : : ; z j 1 ; z j+1 ; : : : ; z p constant). This allows us to show that z 0 satis…es the …rst order condition. The second order condition is that the Hessian d 2 V j =dz 2 j be negative de…nite at the joint origin. If this holds for all j at z 0 , then z 0 is a LSNE. However, we need only examine this condition for the vote function V 1 for the lowest valence party. As we shall show, this condition on the Hessian of V 1 is equivalent to the condition on C 1 , and if the condition holds for V 1 , then the Hessians for V 2 ; : : : ; V p are all negative de…nite at z 0 . As usual, conditions on C 1 for the eigenvalues to be negative depend on the trace, trace(C 1 ); and determinant, det(C 1 ); of C 1 . These depend on the value of A 1 and on the electoral variance/covariance matrix, 1 n r. Using the determinant of C 1 , we can show that 2A 1 v 2 < 1 is a su¢ cient condition for the eigenvalues to be negative. In terms of the "convergence coe¢ cient" c( ; ; ) we can write this as c( ; ; ) < 1: In a policy space of dimension w, the necessary condition on C 1 , induced from the condition on the Hessian of V 1 ; is that c( ; ; ) w. This condition is obtained from examining the trace of C 1 . If this necessary condition for V 1 fails, then z 0 can be a neither a LNE nor a LSNE.
Ceteris paribus, a LNE at the joint origin is "less likely"the greater are the parameters , p 1 and v 2 : Note that for a general spatial model with an arbitrary, non-Euclidean but di¤erentiable metric (x i ; z j ) = jjx i z j jj; a similar expression for A 1 can be obtained., but in this case the covariance term 1 n r will not have such a ready interpretation. Note also that if the non-di¤erentiable Cartesian metric (x i ; z j ) = w k=1 jx ik z jk j were used, then the …rst order condition would be satis…ed at the median rather than the mean.
Even when the su¢ cient condition is satis…ed, so the joint origin is an LSNE, the concavity condition (equivalent to the negative semi de…niteness of all Hessians everywhere ) is so strong that there is no good reason to expect it to hold. The empirical analyses of Israel , presented below, show that the necessary condition fails. In this polity, a PNE , even if it exists,will generally not occur at the origin.
The Theorem immediately gives the folowing Corollaries. Corollary 1.In the case that X is w-dimensional. then the su¢ cient condition for the joint origin to be a LSNE for the model M ( ; ; )is that c( ; ; ) < 1; while the necessary condition for the joint origin to be a LNE is that c( ; ; ) w:
Corollary 2. In the two dimensional case, the two eigenvalues of C 1 for the model M ( ; ; ) are Train (2003, p.39) comments that the "di¤erence between extreme value and independent normal errors is indistinguishable empirically". For this reason, in examining whether convergence can be expected in the empirical logit model, we use the result for the formal model, M ( ; ; ):Obviously Corollaries 1 and 2 can be used to determine the eigenvalues of the appropriate Hessians for the various models.
Recent work by Banks and Duggan (2005) has examined two party competition for the probabilistic vote model. Instead of vote maximization, they assume each party j attempts to maximize the plurality func-
To demonstrate that the joint mean (x ; x ) is a PNE of the plurality maximization game they use the concavity of the plurality vote functions. It is obvious however that if the eigenvalues of the Hessians just considered are not all non-positive, then concavity will fail. Analogues of Theorem 1 and the corollaries can then can be developed to obtain conditions for existense of PNE in the plurality two party game, depending on the distribution assumptions on the errors.
In the next seection we apply this model to elections in the Netherlands and Israel. We consider a logit model for the elections of 1977 and 1981 in the Netherlands (Scho…eld, Martin, Quinn and Whitford, 1998, and Quinn, Martin and Whitford, 1999) . There are four main parties : Labor (PvdA),Christain Democratic Appeal (CDA), Liberals (VVD) and Democrats (D66), with approximately 40%, 35%,20% and 5% of the popular vote. Figure 1 gives the estimated positions of the parties and the electoral distribution circa 1980, while Table 2 gives data on the elctions of 1979 and 1981.
For empirical analysis we include sociodemographic variables(SD) such as education, religion etc. The characterisics of individual i are given by the vector i ; while the e¤ect of these is given by the transposed vector T j : Thus we change the voter utility from (1) to
The MNL model with SD we denote M ( ; ; ; ). The convergence coe¢ cients eigenvalues and log marginal likelihoods (LML) for the two MNL models are given in Table 2 .
The Bayes' Factor ( or di¤erence in LML) is clearly signi…cant when valence terms are added. Thus adding valence to the MNL model without SD has a Bayes factor of 75= [-531-(-606) ], while the Bayes factor for adding valence to the MNL with SD is 101=464-(-565)].
We can illustrate the computation of these parameters as follows. As Figure 1 indicates the electoral variance on the …rst axis is v 2 1 = 0.658, while on the second it is v 2 2 = 0.289. The covariance is neglible. Using Corollary 2 we can compute the eigenvalues for the MNL estimation for the model M ( ; ; ; )with SD.. At the origin the probability of voting for the D66 is For this model, both eigenvalues are negative, so the origin is a local equilibrium for the vote maximising game.
This con ‡ict between the convergence implied by the theorem, and the divergent postions seen in Figure 1 suggests that the CDA positioned itself o¤ the …rst economic or principal electoral axis, in order so as to be better positioned with regard to coalition outcomes . We can illustrate this by the following example of "coalition risk".
Coalition risk
As Table 1 indicates ,with uncertainty about the elections,there are two probable coalition structures:
The second structure is denoted D 1 because it is evident that a "structurally stable policy core" can occur at a pro…le z=(z P vdA ; z CDA ; z V V D ; z D66 ) whenever z P vdA lies in the interior of the convex hull of the three positions z CDA ; z V V D ; z D66 : To see this note that although {CDA,VVD,D66} is a decisive coalition , its members cannot agree over a policy position that they all prefer to z P vdA : It is also the case that this situation is insensitive to small perturbations of party positions, and so the core at z P vdA is structurally stable, or ss ( see Laver and Scho…eld, 1990 , for the de…nition of this term). We denote the structurally stable core at the vector z and the coalition structure D 1 by SC 1 (z)and call PvdA a core party. Laver and Scho…eld (1990) argue that the core party can construct a minority governmrnt and control all perquisites.
Because it is common we shall typically use the notation D party for the family of coalition structures that admit a ss core at the position of some party , where partyrefers to the largest party able to position itself at a structurally stable core position:We shall also say that party is dominant under any coalition structure in D party and pro…le z:
On the other hand, with the decisive structure D 0 there is no vector of party positions that gives a structurally stable core outcome.
To develop a model,of coaltion positioning, consider the question of optimal positions in a situation where the probability 1 (z) of the coalition structure D 1 can be assumed to be 0 for all feasible vectors z: Ignoring governmrnt perquisites are suppose the positions of the party leaders of the three parties are given ,as in Figure 2 by z = (z P vdA ; z V V D ; z CDA ) = (( X3; 0); (X3; 0); (0; 1): Assume further that the outcome associated with any vector z of party positions and the coalition structure D 0 will lie within the convex hull of the party positions:For purposes of illustration,let us assume that at the pro…le z, the beliefs of the party leaders over coalition outcomes are given by a lottery,g 0 0 (z) that speci…es the uniform distribution across the convex hull of the vectors that comprise z To show why the best response of the CDA ,may be "radical" suppose the positions of PvdA and VVD are given by (z P vdA ; z V V D ) as in Figure 2 . and let us compare the utilities for the CDA at the positions z CDA = (0; 3) and z CDA = (0; 1): From the symmetry of the …gure it follows that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U CDA satis…es the equation
By continuity, there is a position denoted y CDA on the arc [(0,1),(0,3)] which gives the best response of the CDA to (z P vdA ; z V V D ): The analysis of the general case of coalition risk is developed further in Scho…eld and Parks, 2000) . Assuming that policy leaders have utility functions that involve a Euclidean metric on policy distance they show that non centrist LSNE can occur for the pro…le (U CDA .U V V D ; U P vdA ):
This example suggests that members of a party may choose positions for their leaders in order to infuence coalition bargaining in their favor. We may call this phenomenon the centrifugal e¤ ect of coalition risk.
The Israel Knesset in 1996.
To further illustrate the theory, consider the case of Israel in 1996. Figure 3 shows the estimated positions of the parties at the time of the 1996 election while Table 3 presents election results for 1988-2003. Just as with the above example, we can readily show that both eigenvalues of the NRP are positive. Indeed it is obvious that there is a principal component of the electoral distribution, and this axis is the eigenspace of the major eigenvalue. The formal analysis indicates that low valence parties should position themselves on this eigenspace as illustrated in the simulation given below in Figure  4 .The fact that Shas is not located on this axis in Figure 3 suggests that it is responding to coalition risk.
In 1996, and using the model M ( ; ; ; the lowest valence party was the NRP with valence -4.52. The spatial coe¢ cient was = 1:12; and the electoral variances on the two axes were 1.0 and 0.732 respectively. We compute Then the eigenvalues are 2.28 and -0.40, giving a saddlepoint, and a value for the convergence coe¢ cient of 3.88. The major eigenvector for the NRP is (1.0,0.8), and along this axis the NRP vote share function increases as the party moves away from the origin. The minor, perpendicular axis is given by the vector (1,-1.25) and on this axis the NRP vote share decreases. Figure 4 , gives one of the local equilibria in 1996, obtained by simulation of the model..The …gure makes it clear that the vote maximizing positions lie on the principal axis through the origin and the point (1.0,0.8). Five di¤erent LSNE were located, in all cases, the two high valence parties, Labor and Likud, were located at almost precisely the same positions. The only di¤erence between the various equilibria were that the positions of the low valence parties were perturbations of one other.The minor, perpendicular axis is given by the vector (1,-1.25) and on this axis the NRP vote share decreases. Figure 5 shows the estimated party positions and voter distribution in 1992, while Figure 6 shows the simulated LSNE positions. Again the formal model predicts that a low valence party such as Shas should adopt a position on the principal electoral axis.
The simulations of vote maximizing positions were compatible with the predictions of the formal model based on the extreme value distribution. For both 1992 and 1996, all parties were able to increase vote shares by moving away from the origin, along the principal axis, as determined by the large , positive principal eigenvalue . In particular, the simulation con…rms the logic of the above analysis. Low valence parties, such as the NRP and Shas, in order to maximize vote shares must move far from the electoral center . Their optimal positions will lie either in the "north east" quadrant or the "south west" quadrant The vote maximizing model, without any additionnal information, cannot determine which way the low valence parties will move. Indeed, the simulations of the empirical model found multiple LSNE essentially di¤ering only in permutations of the low valence party positions.
In contrast, since the valence di¤erence between Labor and Likud was relatively low in all three elections, the relevant eigenvalues on the major axis, for their Hessians at the origin, were also low (but still positive), and their optimal positions would be relatively close to, but not identical to, the electoral mean. The simulation …gures for all three elections are therefore compatible with this theoretical inference. The …gures also suggest that every party, in local equilibrium, should adopt a position that maintained a minimum distance from every other party. The formal analysis as well as the simulation exercise, suggests that this minimum distance depends on the valences of the neighboring parties. Intuitively it is clear that once the low valence parties vacate the origin, then high valence parties, like Likud and Labor will position themselves almost symmetrically about the origin, and along the major axis. It should be noted that the positions of Labor and Likud are particularly closely matched by their positions in the simulated vote maximizing equilibria.
Clearly, the con…guration of equilibrium party positions will ‡uctuate as the valences of the large parties change in response to exogenous shocks. The logic of the model remains valid however, since the low valence parties will be obliged to adopt relatively "radical" positions in order to maximize their vote shares.
It is important to note however, that the position of Shas in Figure 3 is not at all similar to its estimated vote maximizing equilibrium position as given in Figure 4 . Indeed all simulated vote maximizing equilibrium positions for Shas were on the principal axis. This suggests that Shas adopted a position o¤ the principal axis so as to be able to pivot between the coalitions led bt either Labor or Likud. In fact Shas was a coalition ally of Likud until very recently This strongly suggets that an appropriate model of party positioning assumes that parties are concerned with policy, and adopt positions with a view towards the coalitions that may form after the elction. One way to wxpress this inference is as follows.
Conclusion 1.The similarity between the simulation of LSNE for the empirical model and the results of the formal analysis indicate that the formal model can be used to infer the unknown motivations of party principals.
Conclusion 2. The close correspondence between the simulated LSNE based on the empirical analysis and the estimated actual political con…gu-ration suggests that the true utility function for party each party j has the form U j (z) = V j (z) + j (z), where j (z) may depend on the beliefs of party members about the post election coalition possibilities.
To extend the above model, we now introduce the notion of electoral uncertainty.
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Using the expected vote share functions as the maximand for the electoral game has its attraction. As we have seen , the expected vote share functions can be readiliy computed because they are linear functions of the entries in the voter probability matrix ij (z) . At least for two party competition, more natural payo¤ functions to use are the partys' probability of victory. To develop this idea, we can introduce the idea of the stochastic vote share functions {V j (z) : j = 1; :::pg:Then the expected vote share functions used above are simply the expectations {Exp(V j (z)g of these stochastic variables. In the two party case, the probability of victory for agents 1 and 2 can be written
As Patty(2004a) has commented, an agent's probability of victory is a complicated nonlinear expression of the voters'behavior as described by the vote matrix ij (z) : Just as we can de…ne LNE and PNE for the game given by the pro…le function V : X p ! R p ; we can also de…ne LNE and PNE for the two party pro…le function = ( 1 ; 2 ) : X 2 ! R 2 . Duggan (2000) and Patty(2004a) have explored those conditions under which equilibria for expected vote share functions and probability of victory are identical. As might be expected these equilibria are generically di¤erent (Patty,2004b) .
We shall now develop a model based on electoral uncertainty, and can be considered to be a generalization of the Duggan/ Patty models of two-party competition. To do this we introduce the idea of a party principal.
The strategy, z j ;of party j corresponds to the position of the party leader and is chosen by the party principal, j; whose prefereed position is x j :We shall develop the model …rst with only two parties.If party j wins the election with a leader at position z j 2 X, while party j receives a non-policy perquisite j , then the payo¤ to the principal , j; is
Thus the pro…le function U = (U 1 ; U 2 ) : X 2 ! R 2 can be taken to be given by the expected payo¤s
This expression ignores the probability of a draw. In the case of a draw, the outcome can be assumed to be lottery between the party positions z 1 and z 2 :The multiparty model we propose is a natural extension of the two party model and is built as follows.As before, we can examine conditions su¢ cient for existence of LNE or PNE for for such a two party pro…le function (See Cox (1984) for an example). To extend this to a model of multiparty competition ( with p 3; we must deal with the fact that it is possible for no party gains a majority of the Parliamentary seats (or in the case of US Presidential elections, a majority of the electoral college) . We shall argue that in multiparty competition the possible outcomes of the election correspond to the family of all decisive coalition structures D =fD 1 ; : : : D t ; ::D T g which can be obtained from the set P of parties. For convenience we may assume that the subfamily {D 1 ; : : : D p }, with p < T; correspond to the subfamily of coalition structures where the parties {1; ::pg;respectively,win the election with a majority of the seats in the Parliament. Notice that the outcomes {D 1 ; : : : D T } are de…ned in terms of the distribution of seat shares (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::S p ) in the Parliament, and not simply vote shares. The more interesting cases are given by t > p; and for convenience we can assume that for such a t; the coalition structure D t ={M N : j2M S j > 1=2g: Decisive coalition structures can of course be de…ned in more complex ways. Since there is an intrinsic uncertainty in the way votes are translated into seats, it makes sense to focus on the probabilities associated with these decisive structures. At a vector z of positions of party leaders, the probability that D t occurs is denoted t (z ). We can also assume that the vector
corresponds to the probabilities that parties 1,..p ,respectively,win the election. When party j wins then the outcome, of course, is the situation (z j ; 1):That is party j implements the position z j of its party leader and takes a share 1 of non-policy perquisites. When no party wins, but a decisive coalition D t occurs, for t p+1; then the outcome is a lottery which we denote byg t (z) : We assumeg t (z): 2W = Bor(X P ):Here P is the set of possible distributions of government perquisites among the parties, and W = (X P ) while (Bor(X P ) is the space of Borel probability measures over X P endowed with the weak topology (Parthasarathy,1967) . Thusg t (z) speci…es a …nite lottery of points in X coupled with a lottery of distributions of perquisites among the parties belonging to the decisive structure D t (See Banks and Duggan, 2000) for a method of deriving this lottery). We implicitly assume that the utility function of the principal of party j; given by the expression U j ( j ; z j ; j ) above, can be regarded as a function U j : (X P ) ! R and can be extended to a function U j : (Bor(X P ) ! R, measurable with respect to the sigma-algebra on Bor(X P ):Note that if g 2W , then it is a measure on the Borel sigmaalgebra of W . Since U j : W ! R is assumed measurable the integral R U j dg is well de…ned and can be identi…ed with U j (g) 2 R. In the weak topology a sequence {g k g of measures converges to g if and only if R U dg k converges to R U dg for every bounded, continuous utility function U with domain W . We further assume thatg t : X P !W is C 2 di¤erentiable as well as continuous .This means that for all j the induced function U t j : X P ! R ,given by U t j (z) = U j (g t (z); is also C 2 di¤erentiable, so its Hessian with respect to z j is everywhere de…ned and continuous. Observe thatg t is used to model the common beliefs of the principals concerning the outcome of political bargaining in the post election situation given by D t : The common beliefs of the principals concerning electoral outcomes are given by a C 2 di¤erentiable function : X p ! T from X p to the simplex T (of dimension T-1 ) where T is the cardinality of the set of all possible coalition structures. At a vector z of positions of party leaders, the probability is t (z ) that the distribution of parliamentary seats among the parties gives the decisive structure D t . The electoral probability function models the uncertainty associated with the election. Note that this uncertainty also includes the uncertainty over the valences of the various party leaders. We now provide the formal de…nitions for the multiparty political game.
De…nition 6: The game form derived from policy preferences.
(i) The electoral probability function = ( 1 ; ::; T ) : X p ! T is a smooth function from X p to the simplex T (of dimension T -1 ) where D ={D 1 ; : : : D T }is the set of all possible decisive coalition structures. This function captures the notion of electoral risk.
(ii) For …xed D t , the outcome of bargaining at the parameter = ( 1 ; ::; p ) and at the strategy vector z is a lotteryg t (z) 2 (Bor(X P ):This caaptures the notion of coalition risk at D t .
(iii) At the …xed decisive structure ,D t , and strategy vector z;the payo¤ to the principal of party j is
The game form {g t ; t gat the parameter is denotedg : At the strategy vector z;the payo¤ to the principal j is given by the von NeumannMorgenstern utility function
(v)The game pro…le derived from the game formg at the utility pro…le { U j g is denoted
The game formg is smooth i¤ the function U g : X p ! R p is C 2 di¤erentiable. Let U(X p ; R p ) be the set of C 2 di¤erentiable utility pro…les {U : X p ! R p g endowed with the C 2 topology. (Roughly speaking, two pro…les are close in this topology if all values and …rst and second derivatives of each U j are close).
(vii) A generic property in U(X p ; R p ) is one that is true for a set of pro…les which is open dense in the C 2 topology (See Hirsch 1984 and Scho…eld, 2003 for the de…nition of the C 2 topology and the notion of generic property) (viii) For the …xed smooth game formg ; let {U g : X p ! R p g U(X p ; R p ) be the set of utility pro…les induced as the parameters of voter ideal points and electoral beliefs are allowed to vary.
(ix) Let G be the set of smooth game forms. The transformationg ! U g : G ! U(X p ; R p )induces a topology on the set G , where this topology is obtained by taking the coarsest topology such that this transformation is continuous.
(x) The vector z =(z 1 ; :::z j 1 ; z j ; z j+1 ::z p ) 2 X p is a local strict Nash equilibrium (LSNE) for the pro…le U 2 U(X p ; R p ) i¤ for each j there is a neighborhood X j of z j in X, with the property that U j (z 1 ; : : : ; z j ; z j+1 ; : : : ; z p ) > U j (z 1 ; : : : ; z j ; z i+1 ; : : : ; z p ) for all z j 2 X j fz j g:
(xi) z 2 X p is a critical Nash equilibrium (CNE) for the pro…le U i¤, for each j;the …rst order condition dU j dz j = 0 is satis…ed at z . (xii) A strict Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) for U is a LSNE for U with the additional requirement that each X j is in fact X.
(xii) For a …xed pro…le x 2 X n of voter ideal points ,…xed electoral beliefs , and …xed game form g, the vector z is called the LSNE, PSNE or CNE if it satis…es the appropriate condition for the game pro…le U g : X p ! R p : 20 xiv) An LSNE z 2 X p for the pro…le U is locally isolated i¤ there is a neighborhood Z of z in X p which contains no LSNE for U other than z :
Scho…eld (2001) and Scho…eld and Sened(2002) show that ,for each parameter , ;there is an open dense set of smooth game forms,with the property that each formg in the set exhibits a LSNE. In principle, this result suggests that if the electoral function is smooth, and if the outcome of coalition bargaining is di¤erentiable in the location of parties, then there will exist local equilibria which can be used to deduce party positions. Of course, this model is very much more complex than the vote maximizing version presented in the previous section.
For the Theorem to valid, we require that the strategy space X p is compact convex subset of a …nite dimensional topological vector space. Such a space we shall call a Fan space (Fan, 1964) We also require the following boundary condition on the pro…le. Say a pro…le U 2 U(X p ; R p ) satis…es the boundary condition if for every point z on the boundary of the Fan space, X p ; the induced gradient (
; :: dUp dzp ) points towards the interior of X p :Let U b (X p ; R p ) be the subspace of pro…les satisfying the boundary condition.
Theorem 2. Assume X is a Fan space and p is …nite. Then the property that the LSNE exists and is locally isolated is generic in the topological space
Sketch of Proof. For each j, consider the set T j = fz 2 X p :
: By the inverse function theorem T j is generically a smooth manifold of dimension (p 1) dim(X): By transversality theory the intersection \ j2P T j is of codimension p dim(X) in X p . But X p has dimension p dim(X) = pw. Since the set of CNE \ j2P T j , this shows that there is an open dense set U b (X p ; R p ) such that for each U 2.U b (X p ; R p ) ,the set of CNE of U is of dimension 0, that is, it consists of locally isolated points. Now for each such U , construct a gradient …eld (U ) on X p whose zeros consist precisely of the CNE of U (see Scho…eld 1998a for this construction). Since X is assumed compact, convex it is homeomorphic to the ball. Because of the boundary assumption on pro…les, the …eld (U ) points inward on the boundary of X p . The Morse inequalities (Milnor 1963 , Dierker 1976 imply that there must be at least one critical point z of (U ) whose index is maximal. Thus the Hessian of each U j at z must be negative de…nite , and z corresponds to a locally isolated LSNE of the pro…le U . QED.
This theorem suggests that if we consider any …xed game formg , then existence of locally isolated LSNE is a generic property in the space U g :
(from game forms to utility pro…les) is well behaved, in the sense that open sets are tranformed to open sets, then continuity of the transformation would imply that existence of LSNE is a generic property in the space G
An example of coalition risk in Israel.
To see the coalition e¤ect. we note that, after the 1992 election in Israel, the coalition M 1 = fLabor, Meretz, ADL, Communist Party} controlled 61 seats while the coalition ,M 2 of the remaining parties , including Likud controlled only 59 seats out of 120. Thus the 1992 decisive structure may be written D 1992 and has the form { M 1 ; M 2 [ Labor,M 2 [ Meretz,}.Since the Labor position z labor in Figure 5 obviously lies inside the convex hull of the set of positions of parties in any winning coalition, we observe that z labor = SC 1 (z) is also the structurally stable core.. Now it is possible to …nd a pro…le z with z likud lying inside the convex hull of the positions of the parties in M 1 : Such a pro…le we regard as empirically infeasible. It therefore follows that Labor would be the uniquely feasible core party under D 1992 .Thus D 1992 2 D labor . Moreover Labor is dominant under D 1992 with the party positions similar to those given in Figure 3 . As above we refer to this family of coalition structures as D 1 :
Again, using Table 3 , we note that, after the 1996 election the coalition ,M 2 controlled 68 seats and so belonged to D 1996 :Clearly there is a pro…le z with z labor lying inside the convex hull of the positions of the parties in M 2 ;but again this can be regarded as infeasible .We can therefore assert that there is no feasible z such that SC 0 1996 (z) is non-empty, which leads us to infer that D 1996 2 D 0 :
Prior to the 1996 election there were therefore two qualitatively distinct possible outcomes, namely {D 0 ,D 1 g. To examine optimal party positions prior to the election of 1996, …rst consider the outcomes under D 1 . Without perquisites the outcome will be SC 1 (z) = z labor: Since we assume party principals have policy preferences, the principal of Likud should choose a position to minimize 1 (z) = Pr[D 1 ]: One obvious way to do this is to choose z likud as a best reponse in order to maximize its expected vote share Now consider the situation under D 0 : We assume that the government policy position lies inside the "heart" -that is a a subset of the convex hull of the positions in the coalition M 3 = fLikud,Labor,Shas}. As in the previous example from the Netherlands, this suggests that Shas adopt a "radical" position in order to in ‡uence coalition outcomes.
To summarise: Labor should adopt a position as a best response in order to maximize 1 (z) while Likud should minimize 1 (z) : As a …rst approx-imation, these strategies can be interpreted as maximizing the vote share functions V labor ; V likud respectively. For Shas, and other small religious parties, optimal strategies will depend on their estimates of 0 and 1 : Ceteris paribus, the larger is 0 (z) the further will the optimal Shas position be from the axis drawn between the Labor and Likud . Comparison of the estimated party positions in Figure 3 and the simulated vote maximizing positions in Figure 4 suggests that the position of Shas in Figure 3 is compatible with this interpretation of the motivations of the party principals.
Illustration of Party Switching in the Israel Knesset in
2005-6.
We may also make some comments with regard to recent changes in Israel. Figure 7 provides a schematic representation of the current Knesset based on the party positions estimated in Figure 3 and seat allocations given in The …gure can be used to understand the consequences after Sharon seemingly changed his policy on the security issue in August, 2005, by pulling out of the Gaza Strip. First, the Likud party elite reacted strongly against this change in policy. In the …rst week of November, 2005, Amir Peretz, a union activist, and leader of Am Ehad, won the election for leader of the Labor Party. This event can be seen as an illustration of the argument given in Scho…eld (2005a,b) that a party that fails to attract voters because of a low relative valence will eventually be controlled by party activists. From this perspective, the low valence of Labor vis-à-vis Sharon was the reason the Labor members chose Peretz.
Many observers regarded the change in the leadership of Labor as a critical transformation in the political map of Israel. However, as Figure 8 suggests, the shift to the left by Labor under Peretz had no e¤ect on the heart of the Knesset. According to the model, there would be no e¤ect on party bargaining. However, the move by Labor did have indirect consequence. In a high highly publisized move, Sharon left the Likud Party and signaled a strong move to the left by allying with Shimon Peres, the former leader of Labor and the author of the Oslo accords, together with a number of other senior Labor Party members, to form the new party, Kadima ("Forward"). This move positioned Sharon at the origin of the electoral space at (0,0) as shown in Figure 9 . By moving Labor to the left, Peretz created the opportunity for Sharon to out maneuver him. Sharon could strategically move to a position that would increase the probability that he would control the core. Because Sharon's own party members would not support him in this move, he had to leave Likud and form Kadima.
However, Figure 9 suggests that the seat strengths were insu¢ cient for Sharon to actually conrol the core. Indeed, the heart is bounded by the three median lines drawn in the …gure. Since these lines do not intersect, the core is empty. Note however, that the new con…guration of the heart suggests a possible government coalition of Kadima with supporters from factions of either Likud or Labor.
In a much less publicized move, Sharon took his political maneuvering a step further, obtaining the support of Uriel Reichman, founder of the Shinui party, for Kadima. On the face of it, this move seemed hard to explain. Although Reichman is a notable …gure in Israel (currently the President of IDC, the largest and most successful private university in Israel), he has never held an elected o¢ ce. In fact, Sharon promised Reichman the position of Minister of Education in a Kadima coalition government. The purpose of this contract is clear from Figure 10 . By obtaining Reichman's support, Sharon made a small move "south" in the the policy space towards the the structurally stable core. Indeed this position is very close to the position previously held by the Labor Party, under the leadership of Rabin, at the 1992 election in Israel.
Because of Sharon's stroke in January, 2006, Ehud Olmert, previously of Likud, became the leader of Kadima, and faced Benjamin Netanyahu, the new leader of Likud, in the elections of March 28, 2006. It is worth quoting Olmert's recent remarks about his understanding of the election:
For 32 years, I have served the State of Israel. From the position I have assumed due to Prime Minister Sharon's illness, I see an Israel …ghting di¢ culties and great hardships, but I also see the glimmer of hope in the eyes of many Israelis, for the …rst time in many years. And as Ariel Sharon said: "We must not let this new spirit, which grants our peoples hope, pass us by and leave us empty-handed -I have no intention of missing this opportunity. Figure 10 gives an estimate of party positions at the March 28, 2006, election to the Knesset. Although Olmert's valence was obviously lower than that of Sharon, Kadima was still able to take 29 seats. Likud, together with religious parties, took 50 seats. One surprise of the election was the appearance of a pensioners'party with 7 seats. However, this had no e¤ect on coalition bargaining. Because a coalition beteen Labour and the religious parties is infeasible, we can infer that Kadima is located at the structurally stable core position (as indicated in Figure 10 ). It appears that Sharon's change of policy has led to a fundamental transformation in the political con…guration, from the D 0 -coalition structure that had persisted since 1996, to a D 1 structure associated with the new core party, Kadima. On April, 30, 2006 Olmert put together a coalition government with Labor, the Pensioners and Shas, controlling 67 seats.
Conclusions about Party Switching.
It is now possible to draw some general conclusions about party switching and pre-election agreements from the formal models presented above.
(i) Under proportional rule, and with exogeneous valence alone,there will be a centrifugal tendency associated with low valence parties which may make them disagreeable partners to high valence parties. This follows because the addition of a low valence party will surely lower the valence of the higher valence party. If activists are relevant, then their in ‡uence would be to pull the party away from the center.
(ii) Two low valence parties may combine, but this will have little e¤ect on their combined valence, and their optimal position will still be radical. The coalition e¤ect may be pronounced however. Neither party may be pivotal, but by combining they may become, like Shas in Israel, in ‡uential in coalition formation.
(iii) Coalescence between high valence parties may occur. In Israel, Sharon initially formed an electoral pact with Labor. This implied change in party position induced an activist backlash that led to a new party leader for Labor. The consequent policy move to the left opened up the center to a new party, Kadima..
(iv) Because low valence parties may resent the dominance of a core party, they may adjust position, or recreate themselves in order to destroy the center party dominance. This appears to have occurred in 1992 in Italy (Mershon, 2002; Scho…eld, 1993, Giannetti and Sened 2004) ..
(iv) It is assumed here that the position adopted by a party leader is in fact chosen by a party principal who represents the diverse policy preferences of the party elite. If the party leader has low valence, then the party principal may adopt a position near the electoral periphery. This may cause party members to vacate the party in order to move to a party whose leader has higher valence.
(v) An alternative strategy for centrist members of the party is to leave en bloc in order to adopt an isolated but centrist position. In general such new parties will have low valence, and they may be extinguished.
A more general point is the equilibrium concept adopted here is that of local Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium positions will be sensitive to the beliefs that sustain them It is possible therefore for small changes in beliefs about the electoral response function and the coalition lottery functiong to destroy the current LNE. This could cause rapid shifts in party membership, as suggested by the recent events in Israel.
In contrast, the idea of a structurally stable LNE (or ssLNE) can be introduced, where this refers to the stability of the LNE under perturbations of the underlying game form and set of beliefs. The recent events in Israel suggest that a ssLNE may have been brought into existence as a recent of a complex pattern of leadership changes and party switching, leading to a new core con…guration. 
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